An Open Letter to the SAFE Community

An Open Letter to the SAFE Community

Posted by Greenfield Capital - October 4th 2026

This week, Greenfield filed a supervisory complaint (Aufsichtsanzeige) with the Swiss Federal Supervisory Authority for Foundations (ESA) concerning the Safe Ecosystem Foundation. We are publishing this letter at the same time because we believe the SAFE community has a right to know what has been happening over the past year, why we have taken this step, and what we are asking for.

This is not a step we take lightly. It is the end of a long process that began with concern, moved through research and private dialogue, and ended with the conclusion that the issues we identified will not be resolved from inside the current structure.

1. Where Greenfield stands

Greenfield has been a backer of Safe since 2022, when we invested in the financing round that accompanied Safe’s spin-off from Gnosis. We were early, and we remain invested.

We have never sold a single SAFE token. We hold our full position today, as we did on day one. We are not writing as a departing investor, but as one that is staying.

We have always intended to be a constructive participant in the ecosystem. Among other things, we co-authored and put forward SEP-50, a proposal to establish a DAO oversight committee that would bring strategy, process and accountability to the treasury management of SafeDAO. We operate a Safenet validator that today ranks as the biggest by delegations after Gnosis. We believe in self-custody, in the Safe protocol as its most important piece of infrastructure, and in the long-term opportunity that comes with it.

2. Where Safe stands

Safe is not in good shape, and the numbers the Foundation itself has published make that clear. In 2022, the project raised approximately $93.5M. According to the Foundation’s own MiCA disclosures of May 2026, roughly $60M of that has since been spent, with around $34M remaining in cash. In addition, the Foundation holds 8.5% of the total SAFE supply in a strategic reserve and a further 45% on its balance sheet. Over the same period, the SAFE token has lost more than 95% of its value, and with it most of the value of the Foundation’s treasury.

Meaningful monetization of a protocol that secures tens of billions of dollars in assets has not materialized either. At the end of 2025, the Foundation reported “more than $10M in project-wide annualized revenue”, a fivefold increase on the roughly $2M annualized at the end of 2024, and set itself the target of doubling revenue and reaching break-even in 2026, on the way to $100M ARR by 2030. The Q1 2026 report in April repeated the “$10M+ ARR” figure for 2025 but disclosed no actual revenue for the quarter. The Q2 2026 report then showed $1.98M in quarterly revenue, up 42% year over year but equivalent to an annualized run-rate of roughly $8M, below the level claimed for the end of 2025 and less than half of the roughly $20M the 2026 target implies. For a protocol with roughly $30B in assets and a cost base that has consumed around $60M in four years, this is not a sustainable monetization story.

None of this happened in a shrinking market. It happened while the broader DeFi and stablecoin markets grew significantly. Between January 2024 and August 2026, the total value held in Safe accounts fell from $66B to roughly $30B, a decline of more than 50%, while total DeFi TVL grew by around 40% over the same period; measured against the DeFi market, Safe’s relative footprint has shrunk by about two thirds. Stablecoins are the clearest case. Total stablecoin supply grew from about $130B to over $300B, an increase of roughly 135%, yet stablecoins held in Safes (on Ethereum mainnet) grew by only about 11%, from $5.9B to $6.6B. Safe’s share of all USDC in circulation fell from 12.8% to 2.5% over the same period. In the category that has grown the most and that self-custody infrastructure is best placed to serve, Safe has been losing ground for two and a half years.

The contrast with regulated custodians is also stark. Coinbase’s institutional assets under custody grew from around $100B at the end of 2023 to roughly $250B by mid-2025, and BitGo’s from around $60B to over $90B ahead of its January 2026 IPO. The demand for secure custody of digital assets has never been greater; it is simply not being met by Safe.

3. How we got here

Growing concern

In early 2025, we became increasingly concerned about the state of Safe. Our concerns were partly about progress and growth relative to the market, but just as much about governance, communication with investors and token holders, and the level of accountability within the organization.

Then came the Bybit incident of February 2025, the largest theft in crypto history, originating in the compromised developer environment of the company that built and operated the most widely used Safe{Wallet} instance and developed and maintained the core protocol on behalf of the Foundation. Things did not get better afterward. Safe lost a significant amount of talent in the months that followed, and trust, both inside and outside the organization, was severely damaged.

Our review

About a year ago we concluded that we could not form a reliable picture from the information we were being given, and that we had to assemble one ourselves. Throughout Q3 and Q4 of 2025, we conducted a broad, independent review of Safe’s position, strategy and execution. We spoke with former employees and key talent, with major users such as foundations and treasury teams, with independent developers building in the Safe ecosystem, and with other investors and stakeholders.

Our original intention was to aggregate what we learned and share it with the Safe team as an independent outside perspective. What we found changed that intention. The findings were serious enough that we concluded the organization needed a fundamental reorganization of its governance, because every problem we identified traced back to the same root: the way decisions are made, by whom, and with what accountability.

Once we had finished our review process, we summarized our findings for Safe leadership in a deck in late 2025, which we are sharing here in full: Safe Status Quo – Investor View, December 2025. In short, our findings were:

  • Governance. No independent voices on the Foundation board, which at the time consisted of only two members. Major decisions, including cost-cutting measures and the status of key initiatives, were taken without consultation or transparency. Additionally, a clear conflict of interest on the board existed: Stefan George, a Gnosis co-founder, serves as a board member while Gnosis developed, launched and operated two wallet products that competed directly with Safe{Wallet}.

  • Organization. Leadership perceived as unreceptive to critical feedback, an engagement survey in which the large majority of staff said they would not recommend Safe as a workplace, and an accelerating loss of senior talent, including people leaving with large unvested token packages.

  • Product. Core UX still too complex, no coherent enterprise or treasury layer, security investments that came only after the exploit, and a platform that repeatedly ends up competing with the ecosystem projects built on top of it.

  • Strategy and token. No structured business development towards the treasuries and institutions that are Safe’s natural customers, no pricing or monetization discipline, and no token strategy, with leadership publicly stating that token utility was not a priority.

On that basis, our asks to the Foundation were equally clear: renew the Foundation board with experienced and independent board members; refresh the leadership team with external operators who have scaled product-led infrastructure businesses; and run a board-led review of strategy, product, organization and token economics with measurable KPIs.

We want to be fair about what has changed since December. Some of the product and commercial shortcomings we identified are visibly being worked on. Safe Labs has begun to build a commercial motion toward enterprise and treasury users, is investing in the security and policy tooling those users have long asked for, and has shown a willingness to revisit earlier strategic choices. Safenet has been relaunched in beta. We recognize this progress, and we do not want it lost in what follows. But none of it touches the issue at the root of our concerns: the governance of the Foundation. In particular, the Foundation board still lacks balanced, independent and experienced decision-making, and that is the condition on which everything else ultimately depends.

4. A serious finding: conduct on the board after Bybit

One concerning element to emerge from our review was the conduct within the Foundation’s board in the aftermath of the Bybit hack.

At the time, the board consisted of Lukas Schor and Christoph Simmchen, two of the four Safe co-founders and former Gnosis employees, and Stefan George, co-founder and CTO of Gnosis. Christoph Simmchen left the board in the months after the hack and later his role with Safe altogether.

In the course of our conversations with Safe stakeholders, we learned that, in the direct aftermath of the hack, Stefan George, together with his Gnosis co-founder Martin Köppelmann, demanded that the other board members and co-founders of Safe give up a significant portion of their SAFE token holdings. The demand was backed by a threat: should the board members and co-founders refuse, Gnosis would sell its entire SAFE position, roughly 10% of the total supply, and publicly distance itself from the project. At that moment, days after the largest hack in the history of crypto and with public confidence in Safe at its lowest point, a move of that kind could well have been the final nail in the coffin for the project. The board members and co-founders gave in, and the redistribution took place. These events were reported and subsequently confirmed to us by different sources. We further understand that Gnosis was able to exert material influence on how the Foundation handled the Bybit incident.

We want to be unambiguous about our view. Conduct of this kind has no place in a professional environment, and no place on the board of a foundation that raised close to $100M from investors and that stewards infrastructure securing tens of billions of dollars of user assets. We have zero tolerance for it. Beyond the conduct itself, it is a textbook illustration of the structural problem: a board that is not independent cannot act independently when it counts.

5. What happened next

From the end of 2025 onward, we engaged the Foundation directly and in good faith, verbally and through a series of formal letters from our counsel. Our asks were simple:

  • Restructure the governance of the Foundation.

  • Replace Stefan George, whose past conduct and permanent conflict of interest as a Gnosis co-founder and board member are, in our view and that of our counsel, incompatible with a seat on the board of the Foundation under Swiss foundation law.

  • Expand the board with independent, externally recruited members bringing the competencies it currently lacks to responsibly and sustainably develop, promote and steward the Safe ecosystem: corporate governance and leadership experience, finance and treasury management, risk management and information security, legal and compliance, and business development and ecosystem strategy.

To be explicit on one point: we never requested a Greenfield seat on the board. We would have definitely appreciated a representation of ecosystem backers and participants on the board of the Foundation and been more than open to engaging at the board level, but this was never about Greenfield per se. What we ultimately asked for was a responsible, experienced and balanced composition of the board.

We are aware of the Foundation’s own steps in this direction. In March 2026, after several months of our engagement, the Foundation invited backers and ecosystem experts to nominate candidates for three possible participation models, ranging from an advisory board to guest participation on the Foundation board and full board membership. In June, the Foundation announced that it had formally established a “Strategy Commission” as a dedicated body of the Foundation, tasked with helping shape the strategy for the Foundation, the SAFE token and the broader ecosystem, with external participants to be finalized in July. We welcome any widening of the circle. But of the three models put forward, the Foundation chose the one that changes the least. A strategy commission is an advisory body. It is appointed by the board, it reports to the board, and it has no decision-making authority over the board. The board itself, the body that carries responsibility for the overall management, organization and supervision of the Foundation, remains the same three people it was before, and not one of the options that would have changed that has been taken up.

The Foundation also had a statutory problem to solve. Its deed requires a minimum of three board members, and between September 2025 and April 2026 it had only two, in the most sensitive period of its existence. Instead of using that vacancy to bring in a truly independent member, the board appointed Richard Meissner.

Richard Meissner is a Safe co-founder and like all others, a former Gnosis employee. He was one of two co-shareholders and co-managing directors of the German Core Contributors GmbH, that entity which, until October 2025, operated the most widely used Safe{Wallet} instance and developed and maintained the core Safe protocol on behalf of the Foundation, funded substantially by the Foundation. Within that company, he was the key technical lead and responsible for backend and DevOps, the very area in which the Bybit attack originated. He now sits on the board that oversees the Foundation’s relationship with that company’s successor, Safe Labs, and with that company itself. We do not question his technical ability. We question whether someone with that history and those ongoing ties is the right addition to the board, and we think the answer is clearly no. Once again, as with the Strategy Commission, the board chose the option that kept things within its own circle.

Every point we raised was rejected by the Foundation, through its counsel. The problems were not remedied. After several months of this, we concluded that the board either does not recognize the issues as serious, or is so conflicted that it cannot address them.

6. What we have filed, and what it means

A supervisory complaint is the mechanism by which any party can inform the ESA, the Swiss federal authority that supervises Swiss foundations of national or international significance, about potential irregularities in the governance or the management of a foundation under its supervision. Its purpose is to ensure that the foundations it supervises are governed and managed in accordance with the law, their articles of incorporation, and their organizational regulations. The ESA has broad powers to examine and, where necessary, to order corrective measures.

We want to be clear about what this is and is not. It is not a lawsuit against individuals, and it is not an attempt to take control of Safe. It is a request that the supervisory authority, with the powers and the mandate to do so, looks at how the Foundation is governed and decides whether that is acceptable for an organization in its position. We believe it is not. We are now requesting the supervisor to form its own view.

7. Why we are still here

We remain committed to Safe, to its mission, and to the broader cause of self-custody. The opportunity is as large as it has ever been. Nothing in this letter changes that.

We also want to be clear about whom this letter concerns. Our concerns are with the governance of the Safe Ecosystem Foundation and the composition of its board. They are not directed at the operating team at Safe Labs led by Rahul Rumalla, where we see real progress and with whom we continue to work constructively as an ecosystem participant and Safenet validator. It is precisely because that team deserves proper oversight, and the ecosystem deserves a Foundation board capable of providing it, that we have taken this step.

But we have come to believe, after more than a year of research, dialogue and patience, that Safe will not reach its potential under its current governance. Good infrastructure deserves good stewardship. Token holders, users and the many builders in this ecosystem deserve a Foundation board that is independent, competent across the disciplines its responsibility demands, and accountable to the people it serves.

We will keep the community informed about any new developments, to the extent we are able. We welcome questions from fellow token holders here in the forum and will do our best to answer them.

Jascha Samadi, Founding Partner - Greenfield Capital

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Couldn’t agree more. Finally someone cuts through the noise and gets to the core of it.

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I worked at Gnosis for three years, closely with the founders, and this perspective is hard to square with what I saw. Stefan and the team always cared about making a positive impact on Ethereum and the wider ecosystem. The idea of Gnosis as a value extractor just doesn’t fit my experience.

Gnosis is doing a lot today too, actively building products and contributing to the ecosystem. Safe grew out of Gnosis, and I think it’s stronger with their support.

Removing Stefan feels like a big step backwards to me. Knowing him and how much he cares about this ecosystem, I just don’t see the sense in it.

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Seems like you were told to join and post this just 20 hours ago. Although maybe true( not sure) seems orchestrated nonetheless. Simply put without taking at least some steps listed in this post to help align growth patterns it will be very problematic continuing down the same path. The current situation and leadership clearly hasn’t been able to get it done, regardless of their intentions. Change is clearly needed when things are going from bad to worse constantly.

This is what most of us token holders have been trying to better understand for a long time, when we ask we get ignored or met with an answer based on statical number rhetoric. We demand change and as quickly as possible , we can all see what has been going on is clearly failing on many levels and to continue down this path with the same leadership and in some ways what almost feels like dictatorship behavior is not going to help change things fast enough and in a meaningful way. @Jascha please keep us updated as much as possible and what we can do to help get things moving in the right direction sooner rather then later.

Hey Jascha, I understand the frustration. The token is down and it hurts. For transparency, I hold SAFE personally, and KPK has a good part of its treasury in SAFE. We no longer have any relationship with Safe or Gnosis management. We are just investors, like you.

I don’t agree with this letter, and I’m not happy about it. Nobody has more at stake in SAFE than the founding team, including Lukas, Richard and Stefan. And I don’t know anyone better placed to make Safe profitable. They built it, and they are still making it work.
About Stefan, since he is the one named. He has always been token aligned, and he is one of the most active and reputable people in our industry, a reference for many of us. I worked with Stefan for over 5 years and those accusations you brought up, which, btw, are based on unnamed sources, don’t reflect the Stefan I know.

It’s clear that the last few years have been tough for onchain self-custody. Bybit, and then attacks that keep getting more sophisticated. Safe took the biggest hit, but they improved security and are showing traction again. This is the wrong moment to go after the core team. Attacking people’s integrity publicly is bad taste.

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Hi Jascha, thank you for the comprehensive sharing. As a fellow investor in Safe, we see a number of valid points in your assessment. Safe institutional adoption, token utility, and value capture have significant room for improvement; we have been advocates for these items since TGE.

We are supportive of strong independent additions to the Safe Board, and policies where members would recuse themselves from key initiatives or votes where they may have a conflict of interest.

At the same time, we vouch for Stefan’s character and contribution. Stefan is a highly-experienced voice and operator in the Ethereum ecosystem, and knows the ins and outs of Safe - from its core team to its technology. We have interacted with Stefan extensively as a mentor, investor, and founder since 2018, and his long-standing reputation is evident. We believe Stefan will continue to be a valuable contributor to the Ethereum, Gnosis, and Safe ecosystem.

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Igor is here, ex-coordinator at the Ethereum Foundation. As a founder of xDai, which became Gnosis Chain following the merger with Gnosis and Blockscout, which is an explorer for Gnosis Chain, I’ve worked with Stefan on both projects and had a positive experience with him

If I remember correctly, Stefan was already working on multisigs around 2015. Given his technical background and years of work in this space, I can’t think of a better person to have on Safe’s board

I also think it makes sense to bring in experienced, independent board members. That would complement Stefan’s contribution, not replace it. I can’t speak to the specific allegations in the letter, but my own experience working with him has been consistently positive for both of us

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I’ve been in the Ethereum space since 2016. Was at Consensys even before Gnosis did their ICO and worked closely with Stefan and the rest of the team on the security and even development of some of their early products. Safe included.

I find it preposterous that anyone would question Stefan’s commitment to the health and good direction of both the Safe product and Ethereum in general.

I wish you would have been there from day one to witness how non-extractive Stefan’s (and the entire Gnosis team’s) behavior was.

Knowing very well that past performance is not indicative of future results, it’s still very clear to me from my continued contact that both the product’s and the ecosystem’s health are his top priority.

Putting my security hat on for a moment, I can also say that the team’s incident response behavior after the Bybit hack was exemplar. At least from out of the war room, from all the conversations I’ve had with Stefan and the wider team, not only did they handle the technical problem diligently but they also handled it graciously on the social side of things.

All this being said, I’ll add that removing a person with such weight in the community and a spotless technical record of contributions to the space from the board of the company is a big mistake.

I believe this is a person who carries enough gravitas to still enable Safe to attract top talent and capable of steering the proposals and advancements to the product with a much greater objective in mind than the one I believe you subliminally expressed in your message.

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Its seems a lot of people are coming out in the defense of certain individuals named in this post, especially people posting for the first time which I find to be odd. I personally dont know much about any of the people named nor do I really care too much to be frank. My concern is results. So for all those saying the team that has been in place from the beginning is great and doing a great job or that there isnt anyone who’s a better fit, why is the token and investment interest at an all time low when it should be at an all time high?

Why is there no clear short and long term bullet point strategy to get things rectified? What is the accountability if things dont change? It doesn’t seem anyone can clearly answer these questions and when I’ve personally asked these type of questions to some of the people named in this post the response was something along the lines of they’re not sure or they dont know why the token isn’t aligning with the growth of the asset. Really!?

There needs to be someone that calls people to account for the disaster going on and demands change publicly. Im not saying I agree with the manner in which it was done but that is besides the point here. Change is needed asap and this is a place to start. Personal opinions of individuals aside I’d love to hear from some of the people commenting their plans/ suggestions on how to get things rectified.

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Funny how years of public work in Ethereum count for less than a forum registration date. If a new account is grounds for suspicion, why should an older anonymous one automatically get the benefit of the doubt?

I’d also like to hear directly from the Foundation: I support Stefan continuing as a board member, and I’d welcome a substantive response to the concerns raised here :folded_hands:

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Hi everyone, thank you for contributing to this discussion and voicing your perspective, in particular those who have come forward in support of some of the individuals mentioned in our letter. Several of you, LongHash and Igor among them, have said you would support independent additions to the board and a policy for conflicted decisions. We believe that this dialogue is very important and appreciate all your concerns. We said in the letter that we would answer questions here, so let me try.

I know, some of you who have commented here might not believe the facts that we have shared with the community. And I respect that. I didn’t believe them myself when I first learned about it. We are also not saying that the individuals mentioned are bad or malicious people, in particular not Stefan. It’s probably fair to say that he has contributed more to Ethereum than most of us here writing. But that isn’t the question. The question is whether what happened on the board after Bybit is compatible with the responsibility behind the seats on a board, in particular when the board - like in this case - doesn’t have any independent members. We think it is not. That is now a question for the supervisory authority, not for any of us to answer, and we have asked the authority to decide it.

We agree that the Safe Labs team is shipping, and we said so in the letter. But that is precisely why the Foundation that owns and funds it needs a board that is qualified to oversee its operations and understand how to support and enable its team. We have come to the conclusion that the board has demonstrated by its own past conduct that they are not qualified to do so. That is all that we are bringing forward, not more and not less.

Lastly, for those of you here in the comments who might be questioning our intentions and motivation, ask yourself one thing. Assume for a short moment that the facts we shared are true and accurate (because I know they are true, the people mentioned and involved know they are true and our sources know they are true), from your point of view what should be the appropriate and reasonable consequence out of it under that assumption.

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Nobody said one counts more then the other. To me however it does show what people are more concerned about ( reputation) then the actual MAJOR problems at hand. Proof is the pudding. I feel like this has been going on for a while now and people stay quiet, they raised 0 concern but the minute someone calls people out everyone comes out if rhe woodwork. I to look for a response and many of us have demanded this for a while now with little to no result and clearly I’m not the only one where its reached a point beyond frustration.

I’ve held SAFE since $3. It’s the largest position I own, and I haven’t sold a single token. So understand where I’m coming from: I’m not a troll, I’m a holder and contributer who is watching his investment get managed into the ground.

I have to be honest — reading the responses here, almost nobody is disputing the numbers in the letter.
No one defended spending $60M of a $93.5M raise.
No one explained how an ARR target of ~$20M turned into an $8M annualized run-rate.
No one explained why TVL halved while DeFi grew.

The pushback is entirely about defending individuals. But this was never about whether Stefan is a good person — I’ll take everyone’s word that he is. It’s about whether the board, as currently structured, can hold anyone accountable. And the letter makes a strong case that it cannot.

So let me ask the Foundation directly, since Jascha said questions are welcome:

  1. How much runway is actually left, and what happens when it runs out?

  2. Why did the board operate with two members for seven months when the charter requires three?

  3. Will you commit to independent board members and a formal conflict-of-interest recusal policy? LongHash and igor already said they support this — so what is the actual obstacle?

I don’t care about assigning blame to individuals. I care that nothing changes. Respond with concrete commitments, not warm words.

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Hi everyone,
I appreciate the open and engaged discussion.

For transparency: I don't hold SAFE and have no relationship with the Foundation or its board. I've used Safe tooling for treasury and portfolio management during my work on foundation and DAO governance, and I care about it becoming institutionally sustainable.

I’d like to build on the common ground that LongHash, igor and others have voiced around independent board additions, and suggest how a newly composed board could approach this.

A good starting point would be a stakeholder and token-holder analysis: who depends on Safe today, and what each group needs from the Foundation. From there, the Foundation could voluntarily open a public Call for Directors, inviting candidates to introduce themselves here and running a non-binding Snapshot to gauge the community’s view. The Foundation may legally retain discretion over the final selection. Expanding the board to five, once the required director competences on product and network technical security, financial stability, regulatory compliance for network growth are defined, would give it the direct ability to make informed decisions and provide oversight. I believe in certain areas of oversight, sub-committees will be helpful to ensure resources for in-depth analysis of technical security, compliance, growth strategy and financial stability, a regular meeting cadence, quarterly reporting on runway and growth KPIs, and a clear compensation scheme for board and sub-committee members would round this out.

One potential structural conflict has remained open for improvement and deserves the board’s early attention: As it appears to me, Safe Labs GmbH develops its own products while the R&D team builds Safenet, and those products can cannibalize Safenet’s clients. The SAFE Token, Safenet, Safe Pro and other monetization paths should be harmonized under one strategy.

The board could also own policies for operations and token-holder matters such as conlfict of interest, voting and delegation, communication, treasury and signer risk management. Here I would suggest to take a view at a management controlling approach for organizational risk management of open-source crypto projects, by Daniel Resas and Christian Zimmermann in a regulatory working group.

2306_Crypto_Risk_Management_Framework (2).pdf (1.0 MB)

I don’t think comparisons with Lido or other DAOs help much here. The Foundation was minting the back then non-transferable SAFE token after a former spin-off from SafeDAO from Gnosis DAO, with the role of guiding SafeDAO toward decentralization and financial self-sustainability. It had a beautifully orchestrated and well prepared TTE and has been delivering on token utility as far as an open-source DeFi projects could until now. Some token features can only be designed after PMF and Safe is lagging market adoption.

Lastly, these forums are read by customers and supervisory authorities alike, and institutional partners require qualified, reliable operations and oversight even for purely technical services. I hope our industry can show that maturity, so that Safe is seen as trusted infrastructure rather than an R&D experiment.

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Perfectly said and I feel the same exact way